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Abstract 
 
This chapter discusses language and national aspirations through a case study of language 
politics in Croatia. Not only is language crucially influenced by national politics, but 
language politics has played a significant role in national politics in which the status accorded 
to regional variations in language has paralleled political aspirations. Claims to a distinct 
Croatian language and rejection of a shared Serbo-Croatian language have been a key part in 
the Croatian nation-building process of the last decade. Yet recognition of Croatian as a 
distinct language implies recognition of Serbian minority language rights for ethnic Serbs in 
Croatia. Accordingly Croatia specified Serbian as one of its minority languages on 
ratification of the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Since 
ratification Croatia has been criticised by European and international bodies for failing to 
comply with minority language rights provisions for its ethnic Serbs. However, the chapter 
contends that the international approach towards minority language rights provision is 
fundamentally flawed and its criticisms misdirected. Rather than enhancing the position of 
ethnic Serbs in Croatia, minority language rights are inappropriate and detrimental to their 
interests. 
 
Language and statehood 
 
Eric Hobsbawm argues in Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 that ‘Languages multiply with 
states; not the other way round’ (1992: 63). Since Hobsbawm’s book was published a decade 
ago, we have witnessed the demise of the status of a shared Serbo-Croat language and its 
multiplication into four separate languages Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian, 
alongside the collapse of former Yugoslavia and the creation of new separate states. The 
language question in the region has been intimately bound up with the state of South Slav 
relations, often prefiguring political developments (Greenberg 1996). The Croatian linguist 
Ivo Pranjković has pointedly observed that ‘the perpetual politicisation of our standard 
idioms and Croato-Serbian relations must be borne in mind’ (Pranjković 1993: 106).1 The 
accordance of language or dialect status has paralleled political aspirations endorsing 
Hobsbawm’s statement. In essence, the assertion of a common language with regional 
variations has been associated with South Slavism and the aspiration for a common state, 
while the assertion of distinct languages reflects ethnic divisions and the aspiration for 
separate states. 
 
This paper analyses how language debates and linguists themselves have become entangled 
in politics through a case study of language politics in Croatia. Nevertheless, setting aside 
politics, linguistics does have general criteria for determining the existence of distinct 
languages in relation to morphology, syntax and so on. Linguistically, following the 
sociolinguists Robert Greenberg and Kenneth Naylor, not only do Croats, Bosniacs and 
Montenegrins and Serbs share a common language, but they share the same dialect according 
to where they live or come from, although the ethnicised nature of dialectologists’ studies has 
sought to demonstrate otherwise (Greenberg 1996; Naylor, 1992, 1996).
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 Moreover, regional 
variations were objectively more marked between Zagreb and Belgrade in the nineteenth 
century than today. However, the more minor distinctions of today loom far larger in the 
collective imagination than the greater disparities of yesteryear did for their nineteenth 
century forebears. 
 A useful summary for the general reader of the main regional differences in the language 
appears in Celia Hawkesworth’s Colloquial Serbo-Croat (1986):  
 
There are three main dialects of Serbo-Croat, one of which was selected as the 
literary language in the mid-nineteenth century. This dialect is known as 
štokavian because in it the word for ‘what’ is što. (The other two are known as 
kajkavski and čakavski because in them the word for ‘what’ is respectively kaj 
and ča). Within štokavian, there are two major subdivisions, most conveniently 
described as the Western and the Eastern variant. The main distinguishing feature 
of these is the way in which a particular early Slavonic vowel sound has evolved: 
into e in the Eastern variant, and je or ije (depending on the length of the vowel) 
in the Western variant, e.g. mleko (milk) and mlijeko. The variants are thus 
known as ekavski and jekavski (or ijekavski). (There is a further sub-dialect, 
ikavski, spoken mainly on the Dalmatian coast, in which the word for ‘milk’ is 
mliko. This is not accepted as standard speech, however). There are certain other 
differences […] These inevitably include some lexical variations, resulting from 
centuries of separate development. For example, the word for the basic foodstuff 
‘bread’ is kruh in the Western and hleb in the Eastern variant (xviii, bold in the 
original). 
 
Here one should note the richness of regional dialects within Croatia: for kajkavian belongs 
to northern Croatia, and čakavian to the Adriatic islands and part of the coast, in addition to 
the ikavian dialect of the Dalmatian coast. In short, while the standard language of Croatia is 
the Western variant of štokavian written in the Latin script, there is much regional language 
variation within Croatia but these differences are not being politicised: underscoring how 
linguistics is often secondary in determining the status accorded to differences.    
 
Not only is language crucially influenced by national politics, but language politics has 
played a significant role in national politics. Claims to a distinct Croatian language have been 
a key part of the Croatian nation-building process in the 1990s.
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 As such, Croatia is a useful 
case to study Hobsbawm’s statement on the influence of politics on language claims and the 
link between the recognition of language and statehood. Indeed, linguistic disputes first 
publicly manifested discontent among the Croatian elite with its relations with Belgrade. 
Accounts of Croatian secession often refer to the language question in the sequence of events. 
 
First we defended the constitutional provisions on the Croatian language, then we 
formed an independent Croatian state, then we made the Croatian literary 
language completely independent, we established a military force and then we 
created chaos in the once shared language. As our soldiers would say, we crushed 
Serbo-Croat as a literary language like an old tin can (Pavičić 1995: 18). 
 
This statement by a journalist published in the Croatian newspaper Vjesnik encapsulates how 
the language issue is no arcane academic matter but is central to the national question in the 
region. The journalist’s comments demonstrate how the establishment of Croatian as a 
separate language is explicitly linked to the Croatian state-building process. In this context, 
the assertion of a common language is associated in Croatian politics today with claims to a 
Greater Serbia, although nineteenth century Croatian intellectuals had pioneered the idea as 
part of the Illyrian movement. 
 
Codification of a Croatian standard language, as in other languages, involves contention over 
which linguistic forms are included or excluded. Noting the importance of distinguishing a 
Croatian language from the formerly shared Serbo-Croat language, this process has involved 
the exclusion of particular vocabulary or linguistic forms associated with Serbs, rather than 
words viewed as merely dialect or vernacular. Hence controversy over the norms of the 
standard language is ethnicised. As a Croatian grammar of the mid-1990s states, the Croatian 
language ‘serves as a way for Croats to demonstrate and recognise themselves as Croats’ 
(Teţak et al 1994: 27).  
 
However, local politics have not been the only determining factor in the language 
controversies of the last decade. An additional neglected factor has been the influence of 
identity politics on international policy-makers and policy assumptions. In brief, the sources 
of violent conflict are increasingly traced to ‘human needs of recognition and identity’ 
(Burton 1997: 31). Consequently, subjective identity claims including language have been 
treated sympathetically by international organisations in the last decade as part of conflict 
management. Recognition of Croatian as a distinct language also implies recognition of 
Serbian as a distinct language, creating a minority language rights question in relation to the 
ethnic Serbs in Croatia. All across the region, recognition of distinct Bosnian (or Bosniac), 
Croatian, Serbian and more recently Montenegrin languages has been accompanied by 
counter-demands by ethnic minorities for distinct minority language rights. In Croatia, the 
ethnic Serbian politician Milorad Pupovac of the Serbian Democratic Forum, who originally 
trained as a linguist,
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 has demanded recognition of Serbian language rights (Pupovac 1992: 
17). While in Vojvodina, ethnic Croatian leaders have demanded recognition of Croatian 
language rights and called for the Vojvodina authorities to provide Croatian language classes 
in schools (Stantić 1997). Likewise in Bosnia, the three main ethnic groups have been 
demanding to be taught in their own language. In areas following the Bosnian government 
curriculum, ethnic Croatian leaders have objected to ethnic Croatian pupils being taught in 
the Bosniac language and demanded that they be taught in Croatian (Ravlić 1995).  
 
The standard language in schools is an obvious theme in language disputes. In addressing the 
relationship between politics and language, I highlight how political developments are 
reflected in the changing treatment of the language in Croatian grammars. Official approval is 
required for textbooks used in schools; therefore they illustrate official policy and the norms 
of the standard language as well as politics in different periods. That school textbooks 
embody national identity at a particular moment is evocatively described by the Croatian 
writer Dubravka Ugrešić in her essay ‘My First Primer’ (1998). Examination too of 
continuity and change in authorship, that is, of the officially approved linguists, indicates 
both continuity and change in the bureaucracy under regime transformation. Certain 
prominent linguists have managed to bridge regime transformation, not merely adapting their 
linguistic positions to the contemporary political climate but actually remaining key 
ideologues of the new politics and its manifestation in linguistic policies.  
 
For reasons of space, my analysis is necessarily brief and can only highlight particular works 
and issues as representative of official policy and the politicisation of language. That 
grammars can assume great political significance is illustrated by the political storm 
surrounding the publication of a Croatian Orthography in 1971. The textbook was not 
regarded by the federal authorities as ‘a mere orthographic rulebook’, but was viewed by the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia as a ‘nationalist act of sabotage’ 
challenging the state of Yugoslavia (quoted in Babić et al 1984: iv). All copies of the text 
were ordered to be destroyed, and the orthography became a cause célèbre of the Croatian 
émigré community who sponsored its publication abroad (ibid.). 
 
The ‘politics of dialects’ in former Yugoslavia (Greenberg, 1996) has both historical 
precedents and contemporary parallels: contention over the relationship between Dutch and 
Flemish, to name one example, or British and American English, to name another. Yet such 
parallels are usually overlooked. The present depoliticisation of the language question 
between America and Britain allows classical accounts of the history of the English language 
to glide over historical moves for linguistic independence such as Noah Webster’s 1783 A 
Grammatical Institute of the English Language or his 1842 Dictionary of the American 
Language. So Robert Burchill’s classic work The English Language asserts an unproblematic 
history of English that contrasts sharply with the language politics of the post-Yugoslav 
states:  
 
There are no constitutional processes leading to declarations of linguistic 
independence as there are in politics. No flags are run up as signs or symbols of 
linguistic sovereignty. There are not governor-generals of language, and no 
linguistic Boston Tea Parties (Burchill 1985: 160).  
 
Yet Burchill’s confident disavowal of linguistic Boston Tea Parties ignores the political 
significance of past declarations of linguistic independence such as Webster’s campaign for 
an American orthography (Simpson 1986: 52-56). Webster deplored continuing American 
cultural dependence on Britain and considered that the American Revolution could not be 
complete unless there was sovereignty ‘in manners’, cultivated by American publishing 
(ibid.). Radical declarations of linguistic sovereignty were ultimately overridden by internal 
politics: the spectre of Babel loomed larger for American intellectuals than the distant British 
state (Simpson 1986: 46-48). Namely, a linguistic declaration of war against British English 
norms might lead not to an American standardisation but to anarchy in the language and the 
state. As Webster himself is often quoted as stating, ‘Our political harmony […] is concerned 
in a uniformity of language’ (in Gustafson 1992: 313). Always tempered by internal political 
and security concerns, declarations of American linguistic independence lacked momentum 
once the United States felt securely established as an independent state. Thus later 
publications symbolised both statements of independence from and reconciliation with 
British English. ‘If the speller was America’s Declaration of Linguistic Independence’, the 
language historian Thomas Gustafson declares, Webster’s dictionary ‘was a linguistic Treaty 
of Paris wherein Webster maintains that while a difference of language between England and 
America is inevitable, a sameness is desirable’ (ibid.: 320), illustrating the significance of 
grammars for statehood. 
 
The post-Yugoslav states do not yet feel securely established and are experiencing a 
‘Thucydidean moment’: ‘a time when words are perceived to be not a representative sign of 
ideas but a sovereign duplicitous force’ (ibid.). In these circumstances, language debates are 
dominated by political concerns, rather than linguistic realities, until such time as the new 
states and the ethnic groups within them no longer feel insecure and threatened. So while the 
competing demands for language rights may not make linguistic sense and lack linguistic 
necessity, these demands do make political sense for they help legitimise political claims, 
both domestically and internationally. In the case of ethnic minorities, language rights claims 
relate to claims for political inclusion through a specifically recognised status. As such, the 
proliferation of language rights demands is the logical consequence of both domestic and 
international politics of recognition and their codification of identity-based rights. In this 
shared elevation of identity, international responses to the language question in the post-
Yugoslav states have tended to endorse nationalist language politics, which international 
policy-makers are now attempting to unravel. International officials are, for example, 
attempted to de-ethnicise the language issue in Bosnian schools by approving language 
textbooks euphemistically entitled Naš jezik [Our Language] (Gazibara and Zekić 2002). I 
begin by discussing post-war Yugoslav language politics. 
 
Language politics in SFR Yugoslavia 
 
Mindful of the experiences of the Second World War, post-war Yugoslavia sought to prevent 
nationalist politics by depoliticising and defusing ethnicity. Extensive recognition of identity, 
such as the codification of Macedonian as a literary language, was promoted to accommodate 
ethnic sentiment. The handling of the Serbo-Croat language spoken by four of the officially 
recognised nations of Yugoslavia who represented approximately three-quarters of the 
population was considered of vital significance to the legitimacy and cohesion of the state 
(Bugarski 1995: 16-17). In the 1950s there were moves to coordinate standardisation of the 
language in the two ekavian and ijekavian variants, aiming to reconcile the need for a 
standard with the symbolic significance of the two predominant Croatian and Serbian literary 
language traditions, representing the two most populous ethnic groups in the country. This 
standardisation of the language in more than one variant may be observed in relation to 
Armenian, Greek and Hindu-Urdu (Haughen 1972: 107). In 1954 the Novi Sad Agreement 
declared that the language was one: 
 
The national language of Serbs, Croats and Montenegrins is one language, that is, 
the literary language which developed from its basis around two main centres, 
Belgrade and Zagreb, united, with two pronunciations, ijekavian and ekavian 
(cited in Pravopis 1960: 9). 
 
The agreement stated that the Cyrillic and Latin scripts were equal and that both scripts 
should be learnt from the first grade in school. The Novi Sad Agreement was followed up in 
1960 with an Orthography of the Serbo-Croat Literary Language (Aleksić et al 1960), a joint 
project involving the universities of Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb and published in ekavian 
and the Cyrillic script by the Serbian Matica Srpksa in Novi Sad, and in ijekavian and the 
Latin script by the Croatian Matica Hrvatska in Zagreb. Joint work was also begun on a 
Dictionary of the Serbo-Croatian Literary Language. Following on from the Novi Sad 
Agreement, the 1963 Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia 
denominated the official language as Serbo-Croatian, and that of Croatia as Croato-Serbian.  
 
Yet the Novi Sad Agreement only held sway for a decade before the language question was 
publicly re-opened in the mid-1960s with acrimony over the first two volumes of the 
Dictionary of the Serbo-Croatian Literary Language submitted to Matica Hrvatska and 
Matica Srpska. Croatian academics accused the joint dictionary project inter alia of 
representing the Serbianisation of the language in its treatment of certain vocabulary in 
standard use in Croatia as dialect words. At the same time, the existing Orthography of the 
Serbo-Croatian Literary Language (Aleksić et al 1960) was also attacked for not sufficiently 
taking into account Croatian orthographic practice, although it had received praise when it 
was first published for its sensitive treatment of the two variants. That the treatment of 
particular linguistic forms as non-standard should fuel linguistic disputes is unsurprising, 
given the symbolic significance of inclusion and exclusion of linguistic forms. The treatment 
of a term as merely dialect, that is non-standard, is to give it an inferior status as language 
‘excluded from polite society’, as Haughen observes (Haughen 1972: 100). However, there 
was an unwillingness to work on a linguistic solution. 
 
The dispute escalated quickly beyond linguistics and became icons of Croatian intellectuals’ 
general discontent with their position in the state, culminating in the 1967 Declaration on the 
Name and the Position of the Croatian Literary Language. The Declaration was significant 
because it was signed by prominent figures: 18 Croatian institutions and 140 Croatian 
intellectuals including the Croatian writer Miroslav Krleţa and others who had signed the 
1954 Novi Sad Agreement, as well as members of the Central Committee. In the Declaration 
Croatian intellectuals rejected the 1954 Novi Sad Agreement as a denial of the Croatian 
literary heritage and declared Croatian and Serbian to be separate literary languages and 
demanded that the Constitution recognise four literary languages: Croatian, Macedonian, 
Serbian and Slovenian. While the Declaration addressed language, the document effectively 
represented the declaration of the Croatian Spring nationalist movement demanding a 
revision of Croatia’s status within Yugoslavia. The Croatian academic Radoslav Katičić 
wrote in the weekly Hrvatski Tjednik in 1971:  
 
This agreement rests on the unsupported assumption of an alleged Serbo-Croat 
linguistic unity, which has frequently been used to deny the independent 
existence of the Croat literary language and its historical and territorial continuity 
(quoted in Babić et al, 1984: xvi). 
 
These demands then led to counter-demands by 42 Serbian intellectuals who in a Proposal for 
Consideration of the same year demanded measures to protect the Cyrillic script from 
encroachment. This rift was never overcome despite dissenting academics on both sides. 
Cooperation between Matica hrvatska and Matica srpska over the joint dictionary project was 
not resumed. While the first three volumes of the Dictionary of the Serbo-Croatian Literary 
Language were published jointly by Matica hrvatska and Matica srpska in 1967, 1967 and 
1969 respectively, the subsequent volumes were published in the 1970s by Matica srpska 
alone. A pattern emerged in dialectology studies of Croatian assertion of a distinct literary 
language and Serbian assertion of a distinct dialect belonging to ethnic Serbs within Croatia 
which distinguished them from their fellow Croatian citizens (Greenberg 1996). 
 
Croatian concern to secure the position of the Croatian literary language manifested itself in 
the revised 1974 constitutional provisions. The provisions of the three other relevant 
republics shifted towards the idea of a shared hyphenated title or titles for the language. 
However, the idea of shared hyphenated title or titles was now mistrusted as creeping 
Serbianisation by the Croatian elite. The constitutional provision for Croatia sought to 
guarantee officially the existence of the Croatian literary language to appease national 
sentiment, but at the same time retain the previous constitutional provision ‘Croatian or 
Serbian’: ‘The Croatian literary language – the standard form of the national language of the 
Croats and Serbs living in Croatia, which is called Croatian or Serbian’. The Constitutional 
Court of Yugoslavia held that the provision on the Croatian literary language was ambiguous 
since it was not clear whether the provision referred to one or two standard languages 
(discussed in Bugarski 1995: 58-61). 
 
This provisional ambiguity and the cautious response of the Constitutional Court demonstrate 
how there was nervousness about both the evident politicisation of the language and how this 
politicisation might be confronted. The authorities vacillated between taking a tough or a 
more tolerant line. Severe responses were meted out to the use of the term ‘Croatian 
language’, leading to the pulping of Croatian Orthography. But officials were inconsistent in 
relation to the term ‘Croatian literary language’. Authors found they got contradictory 
responses from different officials as to whether the term was or was not acceptable. 
Publication was prevented of a revised and renamed sixth edition of Overview of the 
Grammar of the Croatian Literary Language (1973) (Teţak and Babić 1994), which had 
previously gone under the title Overview of the Grammar of the Croato-Serbian Literary 
Language (Teţak and Babić 1966). Yet other works were published using the term ‘Croatian 
literary language’. 
 
Language disputes were not resolved and intensified from the mid-1980s as political 
divisions manifested themselves in grievances over language rights. In Slovenia, the use of 
Serbo-Croat as the official language of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and military 
courts galvanised Slovenian public opinion against the federal authorities in the notorious 
Mladina trials. In Serbia, the infamous 1986 Memorandum drafted by members of the 
Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences singled out Croatian language aspirations as a threat 
to the language and position of ethnic Serbs in Croatia (Croatian Information Centre 1994: 
71). As these language disputes intensified, academics, such as the Croatian linguist 
Dubravko Škiljan, called for better coordination on the standardisation of the language to 
ensure valid concerns were addressed. One of the last symbolic initiatives was a special 
monograph under the title Language, Serbo-Croatian, Croato-Serbian, Croatian or Serbian 
(1988) co-authored by the leading Croatian linguist Dalibor Brozović and the leading Serbian 
linguist Pavle Ivić. Nevertheless such initiatives had little impact on the course of the 
disputes or even some of the authors of these joint projects who went on to espouse 
nationalist positions. Brozović, for example, became politically active in the new regime as a 
member of Franjo Tudjman’s ruling HDZ party and was a member of the Croatian 
Presidency in 1990 involved in changing the Croatian Constitution. Alongside the new 
constitution came a new Law on Primary Education (1990) under which it was declared that 
teaching was to be in the Croatian language. With new language norms came new grammars, 
although the authors were often familiar names and the grammars re-workings of previous 
editions. 
 
The next section contrasts the treatment of the language in a sample of Croatian grammars 
past and present. 
 
Croatian grammars past and present 
 
Official school grammars of the postwar period such as Grammar of the Croato-Serbian 
Language (Brabec et al 1965) followed the position of the Novi Sad agreement. Not only was 
the language treated as unified in the present, but from its very codification as a literary 
language. Texts emphasised the joint cooperation between Croatian and Serbian intellectuals 
in developing the modern literary language. Moreover, primacy was given to the 
commonality of the spoken word over distinct literary traditions (Babić 1967: 86-87). 
Regional distinctions in accent and vocabulary were not regarded as significant. In particular, 
the ekavian and ijekavian distinction was minimalised as sub-categories of the shared 
štokavian dialect adopted by both Zagreb and Belgrade as the standard (Babić 1967: 51 and 
90; Brabec et al 1965). 
 
In contrast, authorised grammars of the last decade in Croatia declare the existence of a 
distinct Croatian language evidenced primarily on the use of ijekavian and the Latin script, 
and particular vocabulary, morphological and orthographic differences. Cooperation in the 
establishment of the standard written language is ignored or downplayed. Comparing the 
diametrically opposed accounts in the post-1990 Grammar of the Croatian Language (Teţak 
and Babić 1994) to the earlier editions of Introductory Grammar of the Croato-Serbian 
Literary Language (Teţak and Babić 1966) makes interesting reading given that authorship 
remains the same. The later edition strongly refutes the common language thesis of the earlier 
editions, stating that the issues of mutual comprehension, shared structure and stokavian 
dialect are irrelevant and merely obscure the existence of a distinct Croatian language: 
 
Theoretically, its singularity is obscured by the fact that it is so closely related to 
the Serbian literary language that they can be understood almost completely 
without translations. This is because both are based on the stokavian dialect and 
share a common structure and the main body of vocabulary (Teţak and Babić 
1994: 16). 
 
Yet, in the face of the official position on ekavian as distinguishing Serbian from Croatian as 
a language, ekavian is nevertheless regarded as one of the accents of Croatian in their 
grammar (ibid.: 18-19), underscoring the importance of politics in language debates.  
 
In this last section, I will consider the issue of language for ethnic Serbs in Croatia with the 
demise of the idea of a shared language. 
 
Minority language rights for Serbs?  
 
With the official divorce of the language and the declaration that teaching in schools was to 
be in the Croatian language, a requirement was logically created under both domestic and 
international minority rights provisions to provide Serbian language classes to ethnic Serbs in 
Croatian schools. Human rights advocates from Amnesty International, Helsinki Committee 
and other organisations have criticised Croatia for not respecting the language rights of its 
ethnic Serbian minority by not providing special language provision. Yet would one demand 
special language provision for ethnic Britains in the United States or vice versa? Criticisms of 
the lack of special language provision and policy proposals for special language rights 
misrepresent the interests of ethnic Serbs in Croatia and are highly inappropriate for 
addressing their needs. 
 
The minority rights model ironically endorses the nationalist declarations on the language 
question as opposed to linguistic criteria. While the work of foreign linguists has not 
supported nationalists’ language claims (Škijan, 2000: 6), the identity rights-approach of 
foreign diplomats, human rights advocates and conflict mediators has unfortunately tended to 
legitimise nationalist language claims and minority exclusions. The very designation of a 
separate minority language status for ethnic Serbs is to be excluded from the standard and 
thus set apart from mainstream society or ‘polite society’, borrowing again from Haughen 
(1972: 100). While ethnic leaders may press for special minority rights and become included 
in the public sphere as recognised community representatives, it is not advantageous overall 
for ordinary ethnic Serbs. In the aftermath of a war in which Serbia was regarded by the 
Croatian authorities as the aggressor, few ethnic Serbs want to bring undue attention to 
themselves by identifying themselves with the enemy nation.  
 
To illustrate the concerns of ordinary ethnic Serbs, I will briefly highlight issues raised in 
informal interviews conducted between 1996-1998 with ethnic Serbian teachers and parents 
about schooling. The first group concerns the views of ethnic Serbs in Eastern Slavonia 
during the period of transition under UN supervision. Ethnic Serbs in Eastern Slavonia form a 
more cohesive population, than ethnic Serbs elsewhere in Croatia who are politically and 
socially atomised, and their demands differed accordingly. These ethnic Serbs were still 
demanding a degree of autonomy during negotiations over the return of Eastern Slavonia to 
Croatia. International human rights advocates have tended to translate these demands into 
cultural and language rights. However, the right to cultural self-determination did not motive 
demands for autonomy, although it may be recalled that certain parts of Eastern Slavonia are 
ekavian speaking. The main preoccupation of teachers was whether the Croatian authorities 
would recognise their teaching qualifications or experience recognised by the former 
Republika Srpska Krajina authorities. The teachers expressed anxiety that if a degree of 
autonomy were not recognised, the Croatian authorities might sack ethnic Serbian teachers 
who did not have all the requisite teaching qualifications or experience. It is not uncommon 
for teachers to lack officially required teaching qualifications because of the war and the 
brain drain out of teaching to better paid work. As a result of the shortage of qualified 
teachers, education ministries have allowed the recruitment of staff who have not completed 
all their training or without requiring them to do so. Consequently, the position of many 
teachers would be jeopardised were the authorities to insist on the officially required 
qualifications. Their anxiety was not unfounded given that a previous Croatian minister had 
recommended only pure Croats should teach the Croatian language (Ugrešić: 1998: 62). In 
essence, their concerns were about equality before the law, not special language rights.  
 
Subsequently, it may be noted that the majority of schools designated officially as teaching in 
Serbian are located in Eastern Slavonia (Ministry of Education and Sport 2000b: 35). Yet 
what is the advantage to pupils of separate language provision? Effectively the special 
treatment marks pupils off from their contemporaries and hinders their acceptance into 
mainstream Croatian society. That recognition of distinct languages is a barrier to the 
reintegration of pupils in schools and the reconstruction of ethnic coexistence is an issue 
international officials have belatedly acknowledged and trying to tackle across the border in 
Bosnia. One indicator of whether ethnic Serbian pupils in these designated schools feel 
integrated in Croatian society is whether they decide in the future to pursue higher education 
and careers in Croatia or opt instead for study and employment in Serbia. 
 
That the minority rights model course might be viewed as problematic as a strategy is 
suggested by the responses of ethnic Serbs elsewhere in Croatia. Ethnic Serbs outside Eastern 
Slavonia expressed individualised responses to the issue of schooling. Individual teachers 
were unenthusiastic about being identified so publicly as ethnically Serb by being designated 
to teach the separate Serbian language, history and culture classes. Similarly individual 
parents were reluctant to send their children to such classes which might mark them out for 
bullying as members of the enemy aggressor nation. So while ethnic leaders may acquire 
security through a special minority leadership status, ordinary ethnic Serbs are seeking to be 
treated as ordinary Croatian citizens, many putting themselves down as Croatian in the latest 
census. They are not demanding special public provision to learn ekavian and the Cyrillic 
script or Serbian history and culture. Often overlooked by international human rights 
advocates is that outside of parts of Eastern Slavonia, ethnic Serbs will be ijekavian speakers 
and use the Latin script as their Croatian neighbours. In areas of Krajina before the war where 
the population was predominantly ethnically Serbian then locals were more likely to be 
confident reading in the Cyrillic script, because of the greater number of Belgrade 
newspapers, magazines and comics on sale locally than other parts of Croatia. However, even 
in a town such as Knin where the pre-war population was ninety per cent ethnically Serbian, 
it should be reiterated that people were ijekavian speakers and overwhelmingly wrote in the 
Latin script. It was only during the war under the Republika Srpska Krajina administration 
and its nationalist Serbian language policies that there was official adoption of ekavian and 
Cyrillic for public use. Public buildings and shops and cafes were supposed to change their 
signs, and school textbooks were imported from Serbia. Nevertheless, official language 
policy was frequently honoured in the breach, not least by officials who were themselves 
ijekavian speakers or whose staff lacked typewriters with keyboards for the Cyrillic script. 
 
The sort of language recognition required by ethnic Serbs in Croatia is driven by practical 
needs and issues of equality. In particular, there has been a problem with official reluctance 
to recognise documents printed or written in Cyrillic such as past entries in municipal 
registers. Notably, ethnic Serbian refugees have had difficulties with the Croatian authorities 
recognising birth, marriage or death registry entries from the Republika Srpka Krajina period 
that appeared in Cyrillic. This has even been the case where it is clear from the official 
documentation that the same official has been involved in compiling the records through the 
regime changes, switching language norms as required by the incumbent authorities. Failure 
to recognise the records has meant in particular that ethnic Serbian children born in the early 
1990s in areas under Republika Srpska Krajina control have been denied Croatian citizenship 
for a number of years. But again politics influences whether these entries are recognised as 
official records: Serbian language norms have not presented an insurmountable obstacle to 
ethnic Croats seeking to invoke these entries as official records. The issue here is one of 
equality before the law as in Eastern Slavonia. Insistence on Serbian minority language rights 
is not only inappropriate to address the needs of ethnic Serbs in Croatia, but is detrimental to 
their position in Croatian society. 
 
Depoliticisation of the language question? 
 
I have tried to illustrate here how language politics in Croatia is bound up with a 
‘Thucydidean moment’, a crisis of statehood. A continuing sense of insecurity in Croatia and 
elsewhere in the post-Yugoslav states means that the possibility of depoliticising the language 
question in the near future remains elusive. Huge sensitivity in Croatia continues to be 
expressed about the language issue in the new millennium. A Ministry of Education 
discussion document warns: 
 
Given all the negative experience gained through history it is essential to take into 
account the particular sensitivity of the Croatian School, of teachers and parents 
towards the need to shape and nurture national identity, particularly in the areas 
of language, material and spiritual culture, history and authentic heritage, and 
which is being wrongfully usurped by others (Ministry of Education and Sport 
2000a: 18). 
 
Until a sense of statehood is secure then efforts will continue to secure the language against 
its neighbours. That a sense of insecurity impels language wars and demands for language 
purification is evident in the historical development of other languages. The depoliticisation 
of the language question between Britain and the United States suggests the importance of 
security. It was a sense of secure statehood and improved political relations that facilitated 
reconciliation of British and American English. The international minority rights model 
would have complicated and hindered the process of resolution had it applied two centuries 
ago. International minority language rights initiatives are misdirected and merely compound 
the politicisation of language. It is time to revisit international minority rights approaches and 
to examine how they may be unwittingly fuelling the ‘Thucycdidean moment’ and 
legitimising ethnic divisions.  
 
Notes 
 
1. Extracts have been translated by the author of this paper unless otherwise stated. 
  
2. The Croatian sociolinguist Dubravko Škiljan provides a fascinating account of Croatian 
linguistic identity. See Škiljan (2000). 
 
3. I highly recommend Robert Greenberg’s 1996 paper on the politics of dialects in former 
Yugoslavia, which provides an excellent overview of the language disputes and the literature 
on the subject.  
 
4. See, for example, Pupovac’s Jezici i politika (1988). 
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